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Abstract. The continuing series of business scandals, from Enron to WorldCom have severely
undermined the credibility of auditors and audited financial statements in the US. With
developing economies such as China looking to emulate western models of corporate
governance, what lessons should they draw from these apparent failures in auditing? There is
a danger that those opposed to modernization of accounting and auditing will use these scandals
as an excuse to delay the adoption of new standards and methods. Indeed, the Enron/Andersen
scandal was apparently one reason that Chinese authorities watered down proposals to require
firms seeking new Class-A shares to hire a foreign auditor to supplement their local auditor.
In this paper we discuss a more productive lesson that developing countries seeking to bring
their accounting infrastructure up to Western levels can draw from the recent US experience,
using China as a case study. China is the most important of all developing economies, and its
impending entry into the WTO makes reform there particularly urgent. The path that China
takes is also likely to serve as a role model for much of the rest of the developing world,
especially in South East Asia. We argue that developing countries have the opportunity to
“leapfrog” existing auditing techniques in the West that have proven to have serious
shortcomings, and instead, go straight to the cutting edge methodologies of continuous
assurance and tertiary logging. Continuous assurance is a type of auditing which, by making
use of the “electronization” of the firm, produces audit results simultaneously with, or a short
period of time after, the occurrence of relevant events. In comparison with the traditional
financial statements audit, continuous assurance is distinguished by being timelier, more
comprehensive, more accurate and more supportive of the management process. These
capabilities are especially valuable for Chinese firms who face an environment with weaker
legal, regulatory and management controls than in the West. However, the tenuous nature of
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the auditing infrastructure in China makes it essential that it also adopts tertiary logging as a
way of “guarding the guards”. We discuss how logging the audit in a continuous assurance
setting will increase the deterrence capability of peer review, as well as serving as a source of
institutional memory in the case of mandated auditor rotation, the separation of auditing from
consulting and the unique Chinese proposal for dual auditing.
Key words: China, continuous auditing, Sarbannes-Oxley, Enron
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine the lessons that developing economies can draw
from the current crisis in US auditing, using China as a case study. China is an
important area for research in its own right, being an emerging economic
superpower, and reform of its accounting and auditing infrastructure is particularly
urgent with its impending entry into the World Trade Organization.  The increased
competition and openness that WTO membership necessitates argues for the
acceleration of ongoing initiatives that are designed to achieve convergence of
accounting, auditing and governance practices between China and the West. But
there is a danger that these accounting driven scandals -in Australia and Europe
as well as in the US- that culminated in the collapse of the once revered firm of
Arthur Andersen, will result in emerging economies abandoning the aim of
emulating western business practices1. Given the current inadequacies with auditing
and accounting in the PRC we feel that this would be a shortsighted mistake.
Rather, China should take advantage of the lessons the US has learned at such
cost from the Enron debacle to instead “leapfrog” ahead to a state of the art audit
system utilizing the new methodologies of continuous assurance (CA) and tertiary
logging2. Making sure that reform in China stays on track is especially important,
not just because of the size of its economy, but because it is likely to be as important
a role model for other developing economies as Japan was in its heyday.
1 “Backsliding on corporate governance issues is a long-established habit in many Asian countries. Results
of a survey by the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants have given little hope for progress, except
in China where CFOs have made the strongest connection between finance and best practice.” CFO Asia,
December 2002.
2 Encouragingly, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng forcefully
reemphasized the commitment of the Chinese government towards achieving greater harmony in accounting
and auditing standards, strengthening independence, monitoring and supervision of accountants and improved
corporate governance, at the 16th World Congress of Accountants in Hong Kong in January 2003. As the
Premier memorably put it to auditors: “Make no false accounts!” See http://www.acca.co.uk/publications/
studentaccountant/828028.
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Continuous assurance systems, which build upon the enterprise resource
planning (ERP) architecture of a firm, enable faster, more accurate and more
sophisticated auditing. However, CA systems are perhaps even more susceptible
than conventional auditing methods to collusive fraud between management and
compliant auditors. The fact that there has been several such cases documented in
the PRC leads to the conclusion that CA, especially in China, needs to be
supplemented with a system of tertiary logging that will answer the question of
“who guards the guards”. We propose to make use of the capabilities of CA systems
to construct a “log file” of the audit, which will enable an audit of the audit,
thereby deterring collusion between managers and auditors. The log file will also
help maintain the integrity of the audit in the event of auditor change or rotation,
and in particular, will ensure consistency in the unique circumstances in the PRC
of dual auditing. We conclude by also commenting on the implications for the
PRC of the forcible separation of auditing from consulting, as has been mandated
in the US by the recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
2. AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING IN THE PRC
Given its ancient culture and long history, it is not surprising that China was
one of the first nations in the world to develop rudimentary methods of accounting
and auditing. A form of auditing apparently emerged as early as the Western Zhou
Dynasty, 3,000 years ago3. A royal audit court was set up in the Song Dynasty in
992 A.D. and from then on, every dynasty established specific institutions or
offices in charge of monitoring state revenues and expenditures. However, in the
first 30 years after the founding of the People´s Republic of China in 1949,
accounting and auditing focused on the control of a centrally planned economy. It
is only with the shift towards a market economy over the last 25 years that
accounting and audit standards and practices have come to resemble those in the
West. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued the Basic Accounting Standard in
1992, while the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) started
issuing audit standards in 19944.
3 See the discussion of the history of accounting at http://www.cnao.gov.cn/ and at http://www.american-
accounting-professionals.com/history/historical-accounting.htm.
4 Narayan and Reid (2000) provide a comprehensive survey of financial management and governance issues
in the PRC.
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Despite impressive gains in a relatively short period of time, with an ongoing
process to bring local accounting standards in line with International Accounting
Standards, accounting, corporate governance and financial management remains
challenging areas in China today. The nearly 300,000 State Owned Enterprises
(SOE) remain far behind private sector and joint-venture firms in the quality of
their financial and accounting management5. For example, in December 1999, a
random audit of 100 SOEs found that 81 of them had reported a total of Y3.8
billion (US$ 459 million) of false assets, while 89 SOEs reported false profits
totaling Y2.7 billion (US$ 326 million). Worse, previous audits of these 100 SOEs
by 82 public accounting firms resulted in 62 of them receiving clean opinions6.
Even in Hong Kong, which has long followed UK and IAS standards, spectacular
business failures, such as that of Peregrine Investments and CA Pacific Securities
has brought the quality of accounting and financial management into question.7
The situation in Mainland China is compounded by the lack of adequately trained
personnel and shortcomings in the legal and regulatory framework8. Chinese
authorities have had to rely on highly publicized crackdowns to catch wrongdoers
after the event rather than relying on a corporate governance infrastructure to
deter securities fraud in the first place9. But this is a second best solution at best,
and there are clear concerns that the continued development of the Chinese
economy will suffer in the absence of transparency and trust.
In response to these problems bodies such as the MOF, CICA, the Bank of
China, the China National Audit Office (CNAO) and the Chinese Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) have undertaken various initiatives to update
and strengthen accounting, auditing and financial regulations and the level of
training and integrity of finance professionals. One of the most striking of such
initiatives was the announcement by the CSRC in December 2001 that all firms
seeking new A-share listings (domestic listings, as opposed to B-shares which are
5 See Webb (2002).
6 Hua Sheng Bao, 12th December 1999.
7 Cheung (1999). The rather hostile reaction of the Hong Kong accounting profession to the Sarbanes/
Oxley Act is documented in the Hong Kong Accountant, September 2002.
8 See European Chamber of Commerce in China (2001), American Chamber of Commerce in the PRC
(2002).
9 For example, Chinese securities regulators are in the second year of an ongoing crackdown into share
price manipulation and irregular corporate-asset restructuring. (Wall Street Journal, China Targets Price
Manipulation, Thursday August 15th, 2002, p. C14).
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stocks denominated in Hong Kong and United States dollars and which were
originally reserved for foreign investors) had to have their books audited not just
by a local audit firm, but by an international firm as well10. The aim of this unique
dual or “buddy” auditing system was clearly to raise the standards of local auditors,
both by providing them with a role model, as well as deterring them from
developing too cozy a relationship with their clients. Unfortunately, the assumption
that simply being foreign implies that the auditor is more competent and has
higher integrity was undermined by the scandals that were taking place at the
same time in the US. The “Arthur Andersen” argument was evidently used by
local auditing firms to persuade the CSRC to water down its proposal. In February
it announced that the regulation only applies to firms seeking to raise more than
US$ 36 million in an initial public offering, and that the second auditor only has
to be one that is officially recognized by the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance as
being familiar with international accounting standards. No further definition of
what a firm must do to be so recognized was included in the regulation.
This episode indicates that the fallout from the current series of business
scandals in the US and the extent to which they have undermined accounting and
auditing has not been restricted to that country. It is important to understand the
impact of these matters on China´s ongoing program to modernize its auditing
and accounting infrastructure. Despite the continuing crisis in US auditing and
business, few observers -especially those in the PRC- will disagree that the
underlying problem is far worse in China itself11. But that also is China´s great
opportunity, if it so chooses to seize it. Since accounting in China is in a state of
development and flux, it is actually easier to bring about fundamental change
there than in a country such as the US, where a well-established accounting
infrastructure with its vested interests, makes it harder to achieve consensus on
the need for change- as evidenced, for example, by the struggle to enact the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with its relatively minor amendments to US securities
regulation.
10 This provision had previously been applied to A-share firms in the banking, securities and insurance
sectors in February 2001 (People”s Daily, February 14th, 2001).
11 For example, see “Sacking of Auditors in China A Worrying Trend”, South China Morning Post, July 17,
2002: “The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants («CICPA») has expressed concerns over several
cases of ‘malignant sacking” of auditors who failed to issue an opinion over the fairness and completeness of
the financial statements and their notes to the accounts.”
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The continuous audit methodology that we discuss in this paper is the focus
of intense interest by both accounting academics and practitioners, and has been
adopted, as least in part, by leading firms around the world12. A prerequisite for its
use is the implementation of a comprehensive ERP system, and that is very costly
for a well-established firm to do because of the need to replace its many legacy
systems. A firm just setting up its IT system for the first time, on the other hand,
would adopt an ERP system as a matter of course. It is that logic which makes
ERP systems, and so the CA that ERP enables, well suited for the leading Chinese
firms that are consciously evolving towards modern management practices. Of
course the cost and complexity of ERP technology makes CA unsuitable at present
for the mass of small Chinese firms. But there is a deliberate policy in the PRC of
targeting a small number of large firms to be the leading edge for the rest of the
economy and it is these firms that are ideally suited to put into practice the lessons
learnt from the crisis in the United States.
We now turn to a discussion of what these lessons are and the possible role of
continuous assurance in overcoming these problems.
3. CONTINUOUS ASSURANCE IN THE WAKE OF THE
ENRON SCANDAL
In Congressional testimony on February 4th, 2002, Harvey Pitt, Chairman of
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), put forward a set of proposals
for reforming accounting and auditing in response to the unprecedented crisis of
confidence that has gripped financial markets in the wake of scandals at Enron,
Global Crossing, WorldCom, Xerox, Adelphia and others13. The essence of his
argument was the use of more timely and comprehensive information to increase
market confidence in financial statements, auditors and the actions of managers,
and this focuses attention on the role that continuous assurance will play in the
12  For example, see the special issue on continuous assurance in Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory,
March 2002. AICPA (1997) and CICA/AICPA (1999) helped formulate the profession”s expectations of how
CA will evolve auditing methodology. See also Vasarhelyi (2002). In October 2002, centers for continuous
auditing research were simultaneously established in the United State and in the European Union. The US
center, based at Texas A&M University, has the US Comptroller General as the chair of its advisory board,
demonstrating the importance attached to this new audit methodology.
13 http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/020402tshlp.htm.
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future of auditing in the US. Indeed, in follow-up testimony before Congress on
February 14th, 2002, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
Chair James Castellano explicitly stated that a greater emphasis on continuous
assurance would be one of the principal responses of the accounting profession to
the shortcomings highlighted by the Enron/Andersen failure:
“The transition to new reporting and auditing models is going to demand not
only new audit approaches but personnel of the highest caliber. With this in mind,
the profession has been working actively in the following areas: Continuous
Auditing or continuous assurance involves reporting on short time frames and
can pertain to either reporting on the effectiveness of a system producing data or
more frequent reporting on the data itself.  An AICPA task force has concluded
that the enabling technologies, if not the tools, required to provide continuous
assurance services, are, for the most part, currently available. Their actual
implementation will evolve with progressive adoption of the concept and the
emergence of appropriate specialized software tools”14.
Continuous assurance is only one of the consequences on financial statement
preparation, monitoring and reporting of the increasing “electronization” of
business (Slivotzky and Morrison, 2000; Vasarhelyi and Greenstein, 2002). ERP
systems, such as SAP™, enable an entire corporation to be managed “by wire”.
With the ubiquity of bar coding, scanning, automatic transaction recording, and
the low cost of data storage and retrieval, companies no longer need be constrained
to rely on conventional double-entry bookkeeping and a chart of accounts to
aggregate and record information. Smart warehouses utilizing radio frequency
smart chip-based labels, as well as Internet-based implementations of electronic
data interchange (EDI) and newer business-to-business protocols such as ebXML
and BizTalk enable low cost business information capture at the source. XBRL
enables financial information to be accessed frequently and flexibly to create
customized and easily communicated reports and disclosures. As a result, all but
the smallest firms have or soon will have the capability to record and report
transactions in real time.
14 http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02142002Hearing490/Castellano804print.htm.
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Much of the attention CA has gained recently stems from the belief that the
way in which the mandated annual audit takes place will have to change to reflect
and to take advantage of the new real-time enterprise systems that companies are
installing. Thus auditors, as a way of reducing the cost and increasing the
effectiveness of the annual financial statements audit, will increasingly install
monitoring software that will overlay the company´s own IT systems, and these
systems can then be “piggybacked” upon to offer the capability for continuous
assurance. Alles, Kogan and Vasarhelyi (2002) examined the conceptual differences
between “continuous” and standard auditing and pointed out that the likely
constraint on the development of CA was not the availability of technology, but
uncertainty over whether the demand existed for enhanced assurance products.
The current furor over inadequate control and supervision at firms suggests that
this demand is now more likely to arise and CA may finally be propelled into the
auditing mainstream in the United States. By contrast, in China there has long
been consensus on the need for a more rigorous audit environment and so
presumably there is likely to be less resistance to the adoption of CA methodologies,
at least by those firms that have the capacity to implement ERP and compete on
the world stage.
Alles et al. (2002), however, examined the economic viability of CA in the
pre-Enron environment where CA was seen simply as a supplement to standard
periodic auditing. In the light of the expressed views of the SEC and the AICPA,
the effectiveness of continuous assurance in preventing reoccurrences of the kind
of corporate failures characterized by management fraud combined with compliant,
or indeed collusive auditing that have so shaken market confidence needs to be
examined rather than presumed.
4. CONTINUOUS ASSURANCE AND MANAGEMENT
CONTROL
The most benign interpretation of the kinds of corporate failure that the US
has witnessed recently is that they are nothing more than examples of poor
management, exacerbated by inadequate flows of information between managers
and the board of directors (the “few rotten apples” theory put forward by President
Bush). This interpretation has the least set of broader implications, since such
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problem can be alleviated in the electronized firm, with ERP systems allowing
senior managers to dig into the details of transactions about which they have
concerns and CA systems providing real-time assurance and a more sophisticated
set of analytics.
CA extends the analytical methods of traditional audit by examining continuous
flows of data, with models of system behavior used to establish expectations for
data content. Monitoring the content of data flows focuses on examining both
exceptional transactions and exceptional outcomes of expected transactions. CA
software will continuously monitor company transactions, comparing their generic
characteristics to observed/expected benchmarks, thus identifying anomalous
situations. When significant discrepancies occur, alarms are triggered and are
routed to the appropriate stakeholders. For example, alarms with exceptional
materiality can be routed to the SEC in the US, or the MOF or CSRC in China. An
example of innovative banking regulation using CA is the provision of real-time
audit facilities by the Italian bank, BIPOP to the Italian Central Bank15.
Figure 1 illustrates the use of alarms in a CA environment, describing the
“alarm object” , its triggering mechanisms and contingencies. Associated with
the concept of alarm is the idea of “acknowledgement”-alarms that have to be
acknowledged by controllers, internal and external auditors and senior
management. An acknowledgement through a special form of electronic signature
can be attached to a transaction tag (via XML) and selectively become part of the
management log, thereby establishing clear lines of responsibility.
To consider the role that CA might play in deterring corporate failure, consider
that if CA had been in place at Enron then it would have been much harder for
CEO Jeff Skilling to claim, as he did in Congressional testimony on February 7th,
2002, that: “On the day I left, on Aug. 14, I believed the company was in strong
financial condition. I wasn´t there when it came unstuck... This was a very large
corporation, it would be impossible to know everything going on.”  CA could
also have been designed to provide timely reports to the board of directors on the
consequences for Enron of the various “special purpose entities” (SPE) that
15 Voarino and Vasarhelyi (2002).
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ultimately sank the company, because of their unrecognized downside. Indeed,
before SPEs were established, managers armed with sophisticated financial
software might have been able to carry out “what if” analyses under such scenarios
as a declining stock price and disclose their results concerning the changes effected
on the corporate risk profile due to the SPE.
CA might also have played a role in deterring lower level managers from
gaming the system. To take but one example, energy traders at Enron deliberately
understated the volatility of their portfolios by manipulating trades around the
day each month on which the volatility was measured16. CA is not needed to
resolve a glaring error like announcing beforehand when monitoring will take
place. But it can be used to automate routine controls and so remove the human
element that is subject to making such an error, either because of incompetence,
overconfidence, or collusion. CA methodology would reduce the cost of taking
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Figure 1. The Alarm Object
16 “Enron: How Good an Energy Trader?” Business Week, February 11th, 2002, page 42.
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such measurements on a more random, or even on a continuous real time basis,
consequently making such manipulations harder to perpetrate. It could also ensure
that actions did not take place prior to necessary authorizations were obtained
from senior management, as apparently took place at Enron17. Essentially, the
deployment of CA greatly enhances the capabilities of a firm´s internal control
system, allowing for real time monitoring and tracking of significant operational
and financial decisions.
Managers in China have no illusions about the need for tighter and more
modern management control systems, with even the most internationally minded
firms having suffered from embarrassing and costly frauds in recent years, such
as those in the Bank of China and the China Everbright Bank18. Given its own
series of Enron-like scandals, the greater adoption of CA can only help in raising
standards of management control and oversight in Chinese firms.
5. CA IN A FRAUD ENVIRONMENT
The hypothesis behind corporate failure that has gained the most currency in
the American public´s mind, however, is not that it is due to lack of controls
alone, but rather, it is the result of deliberate fraud by managers, aided and abetted
by compliant auditors. For example, the treatment of US$ 7.1 billion of expenses
at WorldCom as assets is the most basic form of accounting fraud, and its auditor
(Arthur Andersen, of course...) was harshly questioned in Congress as to the
purpose of an audit if it could not capture such egregious earnings management.
In other cases, such as with Global Crossing, Adelphia and Tyco, there are
indications that managers conducted transactions designed largely for their own
enrichments rather than because of any interest of the company.
A situation in which company officers are carrying out deliberate fraud, let
alone one in which the auditor is looking the other way, presents the greatest
17 “Web of Details Did Enron In as Warnings Went Unheeded”, N.Y.  Times, February 10th, 2002, page 1.
18 The Bank of China lost some US$ 483 million at its Kaiping branch in Guangdong through money laundering
and questionable loans (New York Times, March 16th, 2002). The scandal at China Everbright, China´s sixth
largest bank, was especially embarrassing because it used to be a showcase bank for China, with the Asian
Development Bank having bought a large stake in it in the 1990s. Ironically those funds were intended for the
purchase of the latest computers, financial software and training (New York Times, August 16th, 2002).
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challenge to auditing in general, and to CA in particular. Unlike in a case of poorly
designed controls or a lack of clear communication, collusive fraud raises the
possibility of deliberate manipulation of the CA system itself. The ability of CA
to benchmark in real time data content against expected values and continuous
relationship among processes, which is the strongest new capability it brings to
control, can be made redundant if it is the parties being monitored who determine
the transactions which trigger alarms.
For example, in the case of round-tripping by energy traders such as Enron
and Dynergy, if auditors and managers program the CA system to consider
matching transactions as routine then all such transactions would slip under the
wire of the CA system. The ability to set such defaults makes the CA system less
effective than a manual audit system, where there is always the possibility that
conscientious new auditors might raise questions about transactions that they
consider unusual-and indeed, this is precisely what happened at WorldCom and
Adelphia19. The value of a fresh set of eyes is also the logic behind the proposed
dual auditing structure in the PRC.
It had long been assumed in the US that the presence of an auditor was largely
sufficient as a check on such actions of management, with bankers, analysts and
credit agencies playing a backup oversight role. But the recent sequence of
spectacular failures was brought about by a systematic failure on the part of almost
all the parties involved in corporate governance. In particular, auditors, who are
paid directly by the auditee and who gain a big chunk of their revenue from
consulting rather than auditing are considered particularly susceptible to pulling
their punches with important clients. China has seen its own share of scandals
with compliant auditors, with, for example, Shenzhen Zhongtianqin, one of the
larger of its local audit firms recently having its license revoked by the CSRC for
failing to detect Y745 million (US$ 90 million) in fabricated profits at its client,
the Guangxia (Yinchuan) Industry Holdings Co.20.
19  Ironically these companies switched auditors as part of a self-righteous rush by its clients to dump Arthur
Andersen.
20 http://sg.biz.yahoo.com/020227/46/2k0mp.html
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In light of these structural problems, the question of “who guards the guards?”
can no longer be assumed away. The only form of tertiary review that currently
exists in the US today is SEC reviews of financial statements and peer review of
auditors. However, in practice, both these practices have proved to be inadequate
to the task. The SEC rarely conducts reviews of firms, partly by inclination, but
mainly because of a severe lack of staff accountants and the funds to hire them21.
The lack of properly trained and adequately compensated staff at regulatory bodies
is an even more pressing concern in China than it is in the US. CICPA has
undertaken a series of initiatives over the last decade to consolidate the number
of accounting firms in China and to raise their level of competence and training.
But there is as yet no ongoing process of effective supervisory review. Indeed,
during the rectification campaign of 1997-1990, self-inspection was the main
process utilized (Narayan and Reid, 2000).
As for the US system of peer review, the fact that Andersen successfully passed
a peer review during the Enron debacle has hardly inspired confidence in that
procedure22. To use an analogy, the current peer review system is the equivalent
of the ISO 9000 process, which certifies that a firm has put in place control systems
to ensure Total Quality Control. But being ISO 9000 certified is not meant to
guarantee that the firm actually achieves industry-leading quality output, only
that it has the minimal controls without which quality production is simply not
feasible.
Since the current peer review system consists of one major audit firm
examining all the activities undertaken by another over a three-year period, it is
virtually impossible to analyze even a single large audit down to the data level.
Fully examining the audit of every client of every auditor is also prohibitively
costly and wasteful, even if it were technically practicable. But a superficial
examination becomes a rubber stamp, with little deterrence value. In particular,
colluding managers and auditors can easily sidestep such a review.
21 “Will SEC”s Needs Be Met? Not by Bush”, New York Times, February 8, 2002, page C1.
22 http://peerreview.aicpaservices.org/firmfile/firmdetail.asp.
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Not surprisingly, since its inception there has been no qualified or adverse
peer-review opinions issued by one major audit firm on another (though several
small audit firms have been cited), showing to the public a flawless profession in
stark contrast with the increasing number of recent audit failures. Thus, the peer
review is essentially a test of controls rather than a form of substantive testing,
and while such tests have their place, they are ultimately based on a presumption
of good faith by the auditee. In the current environment such a maintained
assumption by one Big-4 auditor on another strikes the public as too self-serving.
One way to move in a cost effective way towards having the peer review
consist of a mixture of controls and substantive testing of key transactions of
major audit clients is to make better use of CA systems. They allow for a largely
automated data scrutiny and analysis across a large number of audit engagements
undertaken over several years, making both cross-sectional and time series
comparisons. The electronization that underlies CA also allows it to be as easily
accessed by outside parties as by the firm and its auditor. As such, it can serve as
a window into the firm for the peer reviewer. Moreover, the use of sophisticated
alarms and monitors allows for third parties to focus in on the most significant
transactions without being buried by a mass of routine detail. This would allow
the peer reviewer to actually examine a subset of actual underlying audit records,
or monitor the changes on the auditor´s electronic working papers rather than
simply verifying systems. But even so, CA alone cannot solve the problems with
peer review, because of the volume of material to be reviewed and the difficulty
any third-party has in reconstructing what really took place in a complex and
extended audit.
Even more so than in the US, tertiary monitoring -“guarding the guards”- is
a particularly urgent necessity in China, with its proliferation of very small audit
firms and poorly trained auditors23. The proposed “buddy system” for the audit of
large firms, with a local auditor paired with a foreign auditor -effectively one of
the Big-4 firms- is a form of tertiary review, but its base assumption is that merely
being foreign is sufficient guarantee of integrity. The problems that Ernst & Young
23 We define primary monitoring as the control of firm activities by the firm´s own internal control
architecture, while secondary monitoring is provided by the oversight exercised by the external auditor.
There has been very little attention paid to the concept of tertiary monitoring-the control of the activities of the
external auditor.
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have had with the audit of Gazprom in Russia indicates that even having a Big-4
firm as an auditor does not necessarily improve corporate governance in foreign
locations with weak infrastructure. The CSRC proposal now appears as an almost
anachronistic example of the deference once shown to the major accounting firms.
The counterarguments made by Chinese auditors indicate that reputation alone is
no longer considered to be an acceptable substitute for an effective system of
tertiary review.
6. GUARDING THE GUARDS: LOG FILES IN
CONTINUOUS ASSURANCE
While CA has the potential to enhance the technical capabilities of peer review,
its Achilles´ heel is the possibility that the very managers and auditors that it is
designed to monitor will manipulate its settings. It is clearly infeasible for the
peer reviewer to impose its own CA system across all the clients and audit
engagements of the auditor that it is reviewing. This means that it is the CA system
already put in place by the auditor, which is itself heavily dependent on the IT
systems of the auditee, that will underlie the peer review. This poses a severe
threat to the integrity of the peer review and the confidence in its findings.
To increase the effectiveness -both real and perceived- of audit quality control
procedures, and to further improve the CA methodology Alles, Kogan and
Vasarhelyi (2003a) put forward the concept of the “black box audit log file” (BB
Log). Their proposal discourages manipulations of the CA system by the auditor
or the auditee by making such manipulation more visible, through the creation of
a confidential “log” of audit procedures (and other economic events) in the CA
system. This CA logging proposal can be viewed as an extension of the existing
practice of documenting audit activities in manual or automated work papers and
preserving them for a set time period. However, the log proposal goes far beyond
the existing practice by utilizing CA to systematically implement in auditing such
standard control principles as adequate records maintenance, separation of duties
and proper authorization of audit activities.  In particular, the log file will capture
the critical decisions that directly affect the effectiveness, and hence credibility,
of the audit, such as the benchmarks for the automated analytic procedures. This
log file will be secure and read-only, and be searchable by a peer reviewer, thus
allowing the review to be conducted at a level of detail that is currently unattainable.
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Figure 2 describes a summary view of the proposed BB Log, which includes
three complementary log streams, a log of key transactions and events, a log of
selective control actions and processes and a log of audit processes drawn from
actions in automated working papers. These logs, together, allow for the re-creation
of the economic circumstances at the auditee, at a certain moment in time, and the
evaluation of the auditor´s actions.
Figure 2: Levels of Logging
The point of the log system is to create a permanent record of the most
important audit procedures with an “audit trail” of its own. This log system should
keep track of the defaults built into the CA system and clearly establish lines of
responsibility. It can serve as a gatekeeper between managers and significant policy
decisions on an audit, requiring auditors and auditees to state what they are doing
in a medium that will permanently record their actions and allow for third party
review of them. The intent is to deter fraud and collusion by making managers
and auditors aware that objective records exist of what they knew and did, and
when they knew and did it.
The key to making this system work is making the log itself comprehensive,
private and secure in its contents and inviolate to change, i.e., making sure that it
is impossible to “shred” the audit log file. A variety of technologies and procedures
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have to be involved here. Access has to be granted to view the log at some point,
but essentially it would be “read-only” and encrypted. The master records may be
kept under the supervision of a third party such as the peer reviewer, the SEC, a
commercial firm such as those that today guard offsite corporate computer backups,
or the new Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board set up by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. In the PRC, the MOF can delegate this responsibility to a body such as
the CSRC or the CNAO. The organization of the log has to be carefully though
through in order to prevent it from simply becoming a digital data dump in which
it will be impossible to find the critical information needed to police the auditor.
Sophisticated and largely automated search and database organizational features
must be built in so that auditors will face a high likelihood that reviewers of the
log file will indeed examine their actions more thoroughly than is the case now, in
the absence of logging.
While the log file is primarily designed for use by the assuror of the quality of
the audit work, be that a peer reviewer of the audit firm or another body chosen
by regulators, the log file´s existence would also provide additional assurance for
bankers, analysts, credit agencies, institutional investors and others concerned
about the quality and integrity of the audited financial information provided by
the auditee. Different gradations of confidentiality can be built in to control levels
of access. In the event of corporate failure, governmental agencies would have
access to all log file records.
While unique in its application and intent, the BB log file is somewhat
analogous both to the “black box” carried by commercial airliners and to the
security camera in a retail store. A plane´s black box cannot fly the plane or prevent
crashes, but it can help quickly identify what went wrong; similarly, while the log
file cannot replicate the audit in every detail, it will help unravel the critical
decisions that led to corporate and audit failure-and, unlike with an airlines black
box, the knowledge that there will be ex-post transparency will have an ex-ante
deterrent effect. The security camera also has a deterrent effect -as indicated by
the fact that it is possible to purchase fake, non-functional cameras- but it does
not preclude all attempts at theft. By the same token a log file will not end all
instances of audit fraud or incompetence, but by making the actions of auditors
more susceptible to review, it will make them want to do their jobs better and so
increase the audit´s credibility with its consumers.
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The BB log proposal could be implemented at several levels of complexity or
intrusiveness. The extremes would be pure archival nature use (data is gathered
and dropped in an external trusted bucket) to dynamic interactive use where
extensive analytics are performed in the data streams, alarms generated,
summarization and synchronization performed, statutory reports generated, and
notes to archive examiners introduced. At the first level the BB log acts as a pure
archival receptacle, as in a black box flight recorder on an aircraft. Forensic
accountants and regulators may eventually have access to it. The BB log at its
higher level is a proactive tool that extends CA scrutiny, acts as an intrusive
deterrent of management and auditor malfeasance, and may feed third party
continuous supervisory algorithms24.
The log file can also serve as an additional means of communication by the
auditor, supplementing the audit opinion. In recent Congressional testimony, US
senators demonstrated great surprise at the fact that auditors only have a very
blunt pubic signal -qualify/don´t qualify- to cover what is surely a continuous
range of possible audit opinions. The problem is that the market may interpret in
the worst possible light any kind of qualification, however marginal or immaterial.
As one senator put it, the only option to an auditor who has concerns with the firm
is to acquiesce, or else to use the “nuclear bomb” of qualification, risking destroying
a client over what may be a relatively minor accounting disagreement.
While allowing for more nuances in the audit opinion is a useful goal, a more
immediate solution is to allow the auditor to semi-publicly express any reservations
in the log file. This information would allow the reader of the log file to readily
pinpoint areas of the audit history that warrant further investigation or to identify
instances of lack of zeal, competence or collusion by the auditor. If the auditor
has not logged a comment, then there would be a presumption that there was
complete agreement with the client, and the auditor and auditee would not be able
to blame each other. Of course, auditors may then start to log everything as a way
24 See Alles et al.  (2003a) for more details on the BB Log File proposal. They emphasize that much discussion
and debate is needed on what should be recorded into a log file, who should have access to it and under what
circumstances. These decisions will determine whether the log file becomes simply an extension of current
audit working papers, or a fundamentally new form of corporate oversight. A key issue is drawing the line
between the firm´s internal operational and control logs and the external log of the audit itself (see Figure 2).
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of covering themselves, but even so, the gray areas would be easier to identify as
a result.
The log file can also serve as a vehicle for communicating any other
information that potentially raises questions about the perception of integrity of
the audit, but which do not rise to the level of a mandated disclosure. Thus while
there are already mechanisms for revealing such issues as insider trading and
consulting fees paid to audit firms, the log file can deal with such other potentially
troublesome concerns as the tenure of audit partners and the revolving door
between auditors and the firm.
The scale and scope of information that will be logged in a log file is likely to
be considerable. It is quite clear that without a CA system deployed it is difficult
to create an audit log file as described above. On the other hand, if a CA system is
available, then the requirement of maintaining the audit log file should not be too
burdensome, partly because much of this data has already been collected by the
firm´s ERP system for its own internal decision making purposes, and partly
because it is not difficult to make a CA system log its formal activities. All that is
happening is that the information is being stored in a secure and confidential way
so that a third-party reviewer can quickly find out and assess what managers and
auditors are doing. More fundamentally though, the log file is making use of the
unique technological capabilities of CA to develop new audit tools that were not
feasible before, as opposed to seeing CA as just an incremental advance of existing
audit methods. It is the difference in perspective between reengineering and
automation, and as business has found out, rethinking processes rather than
rethinking technologies is the only way to access the productivity improvements
that new technologies offer.
The most significant barrier to logging is not technical, but institutional. There
has to be incentives provided for auditors to log in the first place, and appropriate
penalties for not doing so. In the US, having a defense in the event of civil litigation
and the desire to reduce the costs of liability insurance is likely to be the main
inducements for audit firms and audit committees to encourage the use of logging
and the specification of what should be logged. Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards can also be amended to specify a set of minimal logging events, which
are then added to on a case-by-case basis by the auditor and the firm.
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Developing the institutional framework within which logging operates may
be actually easier to bring about outside the United States, in countries such as
the PRC, where there is a greater acceptance of government regulation. In
particular, given the evolving state of accounting in China and concerns with the
legal environment, foreign audit firms in particular may welcome logging as a
safeguard for themselves. That will also encourage their greater involvement in
the Chinese market. Bodies such as the MOF, the CSRC and CICPA are likely to
take the lead in mandating the need for logging and the content of the BB log file,
as well enforcing its implementation.
Ultimately whether logging becomes part of the auditing mainstream is a
function of supply and demand, as Alles et al. (2002) pointed out in regard to CA
itself. If there are less costly substitutes available to ensure audit integrity, or no
lack of confidence with existing audit methods, then there is less demand for
innovative practices. But when the reputation of audit firms is brought into question
and investors lose trust in the numbers reported to them, then new practices are
needed for auditing to retain its credibility, and hence, its value. This analysis
suggests that emerging economies such as China, with their still developing
corporate governance systems, should be in the vanguard of innovation in audit
methods. The ability to thereby leapfrog to state of the art accounting, without
having to repeat the mistakes experienced by more advanced economies is a bonus
source of competitive advantage that should not be ignored.
7. LOGGING TO PRESERVE INSTITUTIONAL
MEMORY IN AUDIT ENGAGEMENTS
In the wake of the Enron/Andersen scandal, a great deal of interest has been
expressed lately in the idea of term limits for audit engagements, with mandated
rotations of auditor after three to five years25. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act only
mandated the rotation of the audit partners (every five years) the issue remains
open in the US. We discuss this issue here to further illustrate the potential and
power of the BB log file proposal. It is a particularly pertinent issue in the current
context, given that one of the first places to mandate rotation is Singapore, with
25 Goldin, H, “Auditor Term Limits,” The New York Times, February 1, 2002.
The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 3, No. 5
53
regard to certain financial institutions. This is an example that Chinese authorities
will no doubt follow closely, and contrast it with their proposed approach of dual
auditing. We shall also discuss here the role of logging in the dual auditing setting.
The aim of mandatory rotation is to deter too cozy a relationship developing
between auditors and firm management, as well as to deter collusion between
them because of the knowledge that a new auditor will scrutinize any arrangements
between them. The audit profession has long opposed mandatory rotation, arguing
that a long engagement allows auditors to gain experience and knowledge about
the firm, as well as lowering overall costs for auditors, firms and society in general
(see e.g., Bell et  al. 1997). It has also been argued that given the high startup cost
of a new audit engagement, the new auditor will be especially reluctant to take on
a new audit client to avoid jeopardizing the future rents necessary to recover the
high sunk cost of the new engagement. Empirical research in auditing seems to
support this point of view (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).
Whatever the merits and prospects of this proposal are, it is useful to discuss
the implications of a greater reliance on CA if term limited audits come into
practice. Alles et al. (2002) point out that CA will require a high setup cost as
customized software is piggybacked onto the firm´s ERP system, since it would
be impractical for the auditor not to take advantage of the firm´s own IT
architecture. They go on to discuss the critical question of who will own the CA
overlay and the effect that different ownership and payment arrangements will
have on auditor independence, and the relative bargaining power of the auditor
and the auditee. These questions are particularly relevant if the auditor has to be
rotated every few years.
The reliance of the new auditor on a CA system that it had no role in creating
is problematic. The ability of management to affect system settings and set defaults
means that the new auditor will have to first audit the CA system, a task made
difficult by its lack of first hand knowledge of how the system has evolved.
Obviously the auditor also cannot rely overly on those who do have that prior
knowledge of the CA system-management and the previous auditoræbe cause
that would undermine the logic of mandatory auditor changes in the first place.
This difficulty with the transition between auditors can be greatly ameliorated
however, if there is a BB log system in place. The logs will provide an objective
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explanation to the new auditor of how the CA system has reached its current state
and the interactions between management and the previous auditor that have given
rise to it. Furthermore, audit logs can be built as knowledge structures that explain
what assurance procedures are automatically performed and how they interact.
The rationale for auditor rotation is a lack of trust that the auditor won´t collude
with management given the chance to develop a long-term relationship. Since
that is also the basis of the fraud setting which prompted the proposal for a log
file, it is only to be expected that a log system would be invaluable in a term
limited audit environment. It will serve as a source of impartial institutional and
audit process memory that can survive auditor changes and also allow the new
auditor to more quickly ascertain what kinds of changes the old team had made to
the CA system and what defaults they had agreed upon.
In the dual auditing setting, a log file can serve as a mechanism for one auditor
to comment on the other and to list areas of consensus and disagreement. It will
also facilitate changes in one or both auditors, enabling the new auditor, be it the
local or the foreign one, to quickly ascertain what the current state of the audit is.
Otherwise the new auditor will be in an immediate disadvantage relative to the
auditor that remains. Achieving dynamic stability under a dual audit system is an
issue that the CSRC perhaps needs to think through further. There is a danger that
a buddy system might actually entrench the power of the auditor who holds on to
the client the longest, so undermining the intent of the regulation. A log file system
will help redress that balance.
8. DIVESTING CONSULTING FROM AUDITING
Another contentious issue that has arisen in the US in the wake of the Enron/
Andersen scandal is whether to mandate the separation of auditing from consulting
(Alles et al. 2003b). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act goes a long way towards restricting
the scope of the services that auditors can provide in the United States, and this
has only accelerated the tendency of the major audit firms to divest themselves of
their audit arms26. The question that China faces is whether to go down this same
26 By contrast, the United Kingdom authorities chose to impose no new restrictions on consulting activities
by auditors, opting for greater disclosure instead. That is at least an alternative model for China to consider.
See “Britain Introduces New Accounting Rules” New York Times, January 29th, 2003.
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road, given that arguably it has both bigger independence concerns, as well as a
greater need by its firms for the management advisory services that auditors can
provide.
The independence problems associated with audit firms doing consulting for
audit clients -exemplified by the US$ 27 million Andersen earned from consulting
for Enron in 2001, as opposed to US$ 25 million in audit fees- is clear enough.
But those advocating complete separation have to acknowledge that such a policy
also imposes costs on the firm, the auditor and society as a whole. In the case of
China, integrity has been hard to police even in the case of audits alone, without
adding consulting to the mix. But at the same time, when dealing with firms
whose own management control systems are still weak and developing, the line
between consulting and auditing is harder to draw, and imposing a separation
between them is particularly problematic. Moreover, Chinese firms hiring foreign
audit firms may have higher expectations of what they hope to get out of that
relationship in terms of knowledge transfer.
To understand why any complete separation between auditing and consulting
inevitably leads to unnecessary societal costs, one has to consider the effects that
a audit should normally have on the internal management control system. If the
management control system were absolutely perfect, then the audit process would
not discover any abnormalities, the auditors would certify the financial statements
on the basis of this negative outcome of the audit process, and the statutory audit
would not affect the management control system in any way. Of course, real
systems are never perfect, and the audit process always identifies certain abnormal
events that have to be dealt with. These abnormal events are identified by the
audit tests and procedures conducted as part of the audit process. The probabilistic
properties of the stream of abnormal events captured by the audit process can
provide important information about the root causes of these abnormalities. Kogan,
Sudit and Vasarhelyi (1999, page 94, emphasis in the original) formulate an
important hypothesis about these probabilistic properties:
“Since the auditing system is by its own nature a parallel system, it should
not be relied on for routine control functions, i.e., for detecting systematic problems.
Therefore, the auditing system´s alarms should be truly random, i.e., these alarms
should be a Poisson-like process. ... If the stream of audit alarms is not completely
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random, then the COA system is probably being relied on for some systematic
signals. These signals should be normally provided by the internal management
control system.”
While Kogan et al. (1999) raise this point in the limited context of continuous
auditing, their argument is much broader, speaking to assurance as a whole, and it
has particular significance for the debate over the boundary between auditing and
consulting. Unless the audit process results are truly random, then the audit process
is generating new knowledge, and the auditors are responsible for communicating
this new knowledge to management and/or board of directors. Indeed, auditors in
the US are required to issue a letter to management commenting on the company´s
internal controls and any needed improvements to them. This particular outcome
of the audit process is not that dissimilar from the outcome of a consulting
engagement focused, say, on competitive benchmarking, since it provides new
information, not a confirmation of existing knowledge. The fact is that, since no
management control system is perfect, there must be new knowledge gained from
conducting an audit. That is particularly the case for firms, such as those in China,
who have not had much prior experience of audits as sophisticated and
comprehensive as those provided by the Big-4, and whose own management
control systems are relatively undeveloped.
If the abnormalities detected by the audit process do not appear to be random,
then their root cause is very likely to be a systematic problem in the internal
management control system. The capability of the audit process to detect such
non-random abnormalities is usually due to the development by the auditors of
special procedures or sets of test focused on potential systematic problems.  For
example, in the case of the audit of accounts payable, the auditor might have
developed special procedures to identify duplicate payments. Then, if this audit
sub-process identifies some duplicate payments, the auditor will have to address
this issue with the management and make sure that the identified duplicate
payments are recovered. However, such a recovery, while correcting the problem
in this particular audit, will stop short from addressing the underlying systematic
problem with the internal management control system.
Since an audit is an on-going event (except for the last year in a term limited
contract), if there is a non-random signal one year because of a systematic problem,
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then it is likely to reoccur the following year too, unless the systematic cause is
dealt with. If the management does not fix the problem, then the audit process
will continue dealing with and correcting for a non-random stream of abnormalities
generated by the systematic problem. In this case, the audit process will in effect
become a part of the managerial control system, since it will have to correct issues
caused by systematic problems. This is not an acceptable outcome, since it will
result in the audit itself institutionalizing inefficiency and error, which is contrary
both to the requirements of professional standards, the spirit of an audit and to
what investors think an audit is supposed to do.
In our example, the elimination of duplicate payments as a systematic source
of audit events can be achieved by a transition of the system developed by the
auditor into the internal managerial control system. Such transition will be usually
viewed as consulting, especially because it is a fair expectation on the auditor´s
part to be additionally compensated for this system. Therefore, such transition
becomes impossible if a strict separation of audit from consulting is put in place.
Then, the remaining option is for the client to develop a similar system itself, or
to hire a management consultant other than the external auditor to carry out this
development. Such development will eliminate the systematic problem and
improve the internal control system, but it will be clearly inefficient from the
societal point of view, since it will very likely duplicate what the auditor has
already done. That is particularly the case in emerging economies, such as China,
where resources are limited and need to be used as effectively as possible. In the
case of China, it is surely the case that Big-4 audits in particular will generate a
great deal of information that will be of use to Chinese audit clients and which is
simply too valuable to discard. The high startup costs of initiating audits of Chinese
firms may also require that foreign audit firms be allowed to extend consulting
services as an additional inducement to enter the market in the first place.
The dynamic process of migrating certain tests and procedures developed by
the auditor into operations will inevitably result in certain parts of the managerial
control system being essentially developed by the auditor. While this improves
the managerial system, it will also create another problem with auditor´s
independence in an ongoing engagement since the auditor will essentially have to
audit a part a his own work. The longer the term of a properly conducted audit
engagement, the more serious this problem will become.
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One way to deal with this issue is to impose term limits on the auditor by
mandating auditor rotation, but as discussed in the prior section, that policy has
costs and benefits of its own. Auditor rotation can be facilitated by a wide
deployment of continuous auditing and the adoption of the BB log file enabled by
CA. The log file can also record what information generated by the audit is
transferred to the firm´s management control system, so enabling the line between
consulting and auditing to be more easily identified. More importantly, logging
can also serve as a substitute mechanism for strengthening the integrity of an
audit if auditor rotation and the separation of auditing and consulting are ruled
out as too costly a means of ensuring independence.
9. CONCLUSION
The testimony by the SEC and the AICPA to the US Congress presents a
sanguine view of the ability of continuous assurance to prevent the kinds of
systematic problems with auditing brought to the surface by the Enron/Andersen
scandal. While CA unquestionably represents a dramatic increase in the power of
auditing, it is important that its strengths are not oversold and its weakness
underestimated. Where there is fraudulent collusion, it is conceivable that the
manager and auditor could substantially tamper with a continuous audit system
and circumvent its alarms and warnings. Indeed, CA systems may be more
vulnerable to such interference than a standard audit, given CA´s greater reliance
on automated procedures.
The main goal of the proposed BB log system is to cover this fundamental
“Achilles´ Heel” of the CA system, that the very people that it is meant to monitor
can manipulate it. The log file takes advantage of the electronization of the firm
to create revolutionary new audit methodologies, rather than simply using
technology to automate existing audit methods. The log file also serves as a
valuable source of institutional memory in the event of mandated auditor rotation.
The value of the log file is greater in environments with weaker substitutes for
ensuring auditor integrity, making it particularly well suited for a developing
economy like China. While the high level of technical sophistication that it
demands will restrict the use of the BB log file to the most advanced and
internationally minded Chinese firms, logging will also serve to give these firms
critical credibility on the world financial stage.
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The People´s Republic of China is an emerging giant in the world economy,
but as its government has clearly recognized, a prerequisite for reaching the next
level of development are modern and rigorous systems of corporate governance
and auditing. In much the same way as many developing economies were able to
skip the intermediary step of landlines and leapfrog to cutting edge wireless
telephony, so the PRC has the opening to put the lessons learnt from the recent
US experiences into practice faster than other countries and thereby gain a true
competitive advantage as a result. It is after all, reputed to be an old Chinese
proverb that states, “In every crisis there is an opportunity” and it is an even
happier set of circumstances if the opportunity arises from someone else´s crisis.
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